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Trade Secrets as Private Property: 
Their Constitutional Protection 
 
Richard A. Epstein* 
 
 
 The field of intellectual property is a growth industry that may involve an 
unintended consequence of Moore’s Law in that the number of published articles in the 
field doubles on average every eighteen months. Most of that increased effort has been 
devoted to copyright and patents. But intellectual property also includes the difficult and 
critical area of trade secrets. The current definition of a trade secret allows for protection 
of information of any sort: “A trade secret is any information that can be used in the 
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to 
afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”1  
The logic for protecting trade secrets parallels that for patents and copyrights. 
People will not develop certain forms of information at private cost if the benefits of that 
information can be immediately socialized by the unilateral actions of others. Patents 
allow for exclusivity only for individuals who disclose their information, which in some 
cases, e.g. processes and know-how, undermine its value to its owner because it is 
difficult to monitor its use by others. Trade secrets offer both an alternative to patent 
protection for inventions, and an exclusive source of protection to matters as diverse as 
know-how, recipes, and customer lists. Unlike the holder of a patent, the “owner” of the 
                                                 
*James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law. 
1RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). In some sense I prefer the highly 
influential but somewhat archaic view of trade secrets in the Restatement of Torts:  
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, 
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757 cmt. b. (1946). 
trade secret (if we may use that phrase) loses all grip once the trade secret is disclosed, no 
matter how much labor went into the creation of that secret. He is vulnerable to the 
chance discovery of the secret and to reverse engineering. Ironically, it is quite possible 
that one owner of the trade secret is unaware that it is possessed by a second owner, who 
also has a strong incentive to keep it private.  
Unlike patents and copyrights, trade secrets are protected primarily by state law 
rules, with some limited federal protection thrown into the mix.2 One gap in the system 
leads to a loss of protection for everyone, so that the gains from a uniform and consistent 
set of rules for trade secrets are enormous, but those gains can be realized only through 
consistent interpretation and enforcement of the rules. For the most part, this congruence 
has taken place on the subconstitutional level. However, the constitutional dimensions of 
trade secret law are important when trade secrets are subject to federal and state 
regulation. This constitutional importance is often on grounds of health and safety 
regulation as it relates to the takings clause.  
In dealing with this problem it is important not to overestimate the distinctive 
nature of intellectual property and underestimate its continuity with tangible forms of 
property. Indeed, the case law on this subject offers a back-handed vindication of this 
thesis by its excessive reliance on and misapplication of the now-canonical but 
intellectually defensible distinction between physical and regulatory takings.3  I hope to 
show how these difficulties play themselves out in connection with two key cases under 
                                                 
2See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1999)). 
3See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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the takings clause—the now venerable decision in Monsanto Co v. Ruckelshaus,4 and the 
more recent First Circuit decision in Philip Morris v. Reilly.5 
The takings clause to the United States Constitution provides: “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”6 Quickly summarized,7 a 
complete interpretation of the clause requires a court to address four questions: Has 
private property been taken? If so, was there some justification for that taking under the 
police power? If not, was the taking for a public use? And if so, has just compensation 
been provided? The actual articulation of each of these elements bristles with difficulties 
in ordinary cases associated with land. We should not be surprised to find that these 
problems will surface in the more specific context of trade secrets, where the intangible 
nature of the right adds yet another layer of interpretive difficulty.  
I.  TRADE SECRETS AS PROPERTY  
The first question requires us to decide whether trade secrets should be treated as 
property at all. The question is of no little importance because if trade secrets are treated 
as mere contract rights, then they are good only against the promisor. But if they are 
treated as property rights, then in a stronger sense they provide exclusive rights that bind 
the world.  One possible argument against treating trade secrets as property is that they do 
not satisfy this exclusivity condition because the holder of the secret has no way to know 
whether others have independently developed the trade secret on their own. Indeed, under 
the customary formulation of the doctrine, other individuals have a privilege to reverse 
                                                 
4467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
5312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002). 
6U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
7See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
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engineer the trade secret for their own use.8 The configuration of the right therefore looks 
quite different from that associated with land or patents, but not, on this point at least, 
with copyrights, where the independent creation is a defense against a charge of copying. 
In consequence of these arguments, Pamela Samuelson has forcefully argued that 
trade secrets should not be considered as a form of property at all, but should rather be 
understood as a series of undertakings that bind individuals who have received a trade 
secret in the course of some confidential relationship.9 She acknowledges of course that 
trade secrets are alienable and descendible, but does not think that trade secrets rate as 
property interests because they lack that in rem feeling. They are not good against the rest 
of the world in the sense that the law will not prevent anyone from making an 
independent acquisition of the information in question, or indeed from finding by lawful 
means the trade secret, and using it to his own advantage. Treating trade secrets solely as 
a web of confidential arrangements means that the protection the law affords is not good 
against any third-party, who acquires the trade secret outside of some confidential 
arrangement. But that narrow definition would not prevent strangers from stealing 
information or from acquiring it from a person whom they knew had acquired the 
information by unlawful means.  
 In contrast to what Samuelson believes, the current law goes beyond the case of 
contractual breach so as to reach any individual who misappropriates the information, 
                                                 
8See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). 
9See Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckleshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy 
as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153 n.148 (2000) (noting Justice Holmes’s opinion in E. 
I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, which observed: "Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable 
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he 
accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the 
present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations 
with the plaintiffs." (244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)) [hereinafter Samuelson, Privacy]. 
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including receiving it with knowledge that some prior person had misappropriated it.10 
No one could acquire information lawfully from a person whom he knows has passed the 
information on in breach of a confidential arrangement.  The only cases that seem to be 
excluded are those of “innocent acquisition,” as with the person who finds the recipe 
book at a train station after it was misplaced by its owner.  But even in this last case, I see 
no reason why the owner of the trade secret (to beg the question) should not be allowed 
to enjoin the use of the information innocently acquired by a third-person before it has 
been disclosed to the public at large. The innocent converters of tangible property cannot 
keep what they have. Their only protection is a right to recoup for the value that they 
added to the property of the owner. The analogous remedy to the sort that is routinely 
imposed in voluntary transfers of trade secrets would be a return of any document that 
contains the trade secret coupled with an obligation not to use it in one’s own affairs. 
Yet the difficulties here go further. To speak of a trade secret as though it 
emanates solely from a confidential arrangement puts the cart before the horse. There is 
no obvious reason why a single person cannot develop and keep a trade secret for 
himself. The fact that the information is not shared with a single soul does not strip it of 
legal protection. Rather the contrary seems to be true. It is precisely the right of an 
individual to keep that secret to himself that allows him to disclose it to other individuals 
under a condition of confidentiality. It would be odd to enforce any contract to keep the 
information confidential if the original holder or creator of the trade secret had no 
property rights in it at all. After all, we do not say that someone becomes the owner of 
property because he has leased it; rather the reverse is true: because he is the owner, he is 
normally in a position to lease the property.  In virtue of the ability of individuals to both 
                                                 
10See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2) on misappropriation.  
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keep and transfer information, special rules must be made with respect to the further 
transfer of information received under a license or other confidential agreement. 
Although the usual rules of property and contract look askance as consensual restraints 
on alienation,11 the presumptions are reversed in dealing with trade secrets: anyone who 
transfers the information to a third party may still keep it to himself. The greater the 
number of individuals who hold the trade secret, there is a greater risk of leakage and 
with it destruction. The optimal norm therefore is one against allowing the retransfer of 
information that has been obtained by license.12 The point here is important not because it 
tells us whether to treat trade secrets as property or strictly as confidential arrangements. 
Rather, it is important because of the light that it sheds on the need to tailor standard legal 
principles to take into account the easy reproducibility of trade secret information. 
II.  PHYSICAL AND REGULATORY TAKINGS  
The recognition that trade secrets count as property interests sets the stage for the 
analysis of the role of the takings clause with respect to this issue. The key case in this 
history is Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.13 In this case, the government flat-out conceded 
that trade secrets were property under Missouri law when the matter came before the 
United States Supreme Court.14 The Court eventually held that trade secrets were 
property under Missouri law, and thus protected against confiscation under the takings 
clause of the constitution.15 The next question that arises is just what form does that 
protection take? An easy case is when the government engages in a forced assignment of 
a trade secret, the terms of which allow it to use the information in secret for its own 
                                                 
11But see Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985). 
12Samuelson, Privacy, supra note 9, at 1056-1057. 
13467 U.S. 986 (1984).  
14Id. at 1001. 
15Id. at 1001–1003. 
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purposes, while forbidding the original holder of the trade secret and its licensees, if any, 
from making any further use of the trade secret on their own. The point of this illustration 
ties in closely to the Supreme Court’s now-dominant (if incoherent) organization of 
takings law. The most obvious form of a taking is the occupation of tangible property, 
which is in general subject to a rule of virtual per se invalidity.16 The original owner loses 
possession of the thing, which is taken over by the government. If this outright transfer of 
ownership does not count as a taking, then the entire clause is useless and irrelevant.  
In some cases, however, it has been argued that the high standard of judicial 
review associated with physical occupation of property does not carry over to the realm 
of intellectual property. After all, if the property is intellectual, then how can it be 
subject, almost by definition, no less, to physical occupation? The objection exalts 
literalism over functionalism. The entire point of the argument for per se compensation 
for physical occupation is that it condemns the behavior of the government, whether one 
looks at the issue from the benefit or the cost side. Thus, the individual property owner 
has certainly suffered a loss from the state’s denial of its right to use the trade secret. But 
in some cases, most notably with good will, the Supreme Court has held that its 
destruction of the trade secret is not compensable because it does not represent any 
“property taken” by the government.17  Here of course the total prohibition on use counts 
as a loss that is matched in full by the public benefit from the state’s using the trade secret 
for its own purposes, which is the precise analogy to physical occupation with tangible 
property. The major question that remains is whether the compensation in question 
                                                 
16See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
17See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (using the “property taken” 
language from Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States (148 U.S. 312, 325-326 (1893)). But see 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, IN AND OUT OF PUBLIC SOLUTION, IN PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT 
AND LAW 307, 317-321 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds. (2003)).  
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should be measured by the gain to the government or the loss to the owner, for which the 
correct answer is the latter. If the value to the state is lower than it is to the owner, then 
the property should not be taken at all. And if it is greater, then the government can 
afford to make the compensation and come out the net winner. The underlying dynamics 
of how takings rules are used to constrain government behavior do not fall into abeyance 
in dealing with trade secrets. The per se rule of the physical occupation cases has its 
direct analog in the law of trade secrets. 
The process of analogy can also be carried over to the next type of cases, in which 
the holder of a trade secret is allowed to continue to practice the secret himself, but loses 
the property right of exclusion. That residual right to use along with others is not wholly 
worthless. Parity is preferable to exclusion: it is better to be able to use the process even 
when others use it than it is to be barred from its use altogether. But it hardly follows that 
the reduction from a position of dominance to one of parity does not count as a loss, 
simply because state action could have reduced that position to one of absolute 
inferiority.  
The cases of tangible property again provide a sensible guide to the overall 
situation. The key case is Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 18 where the Court held that the 
United States had committed a physical taking when it forced the builder of a private 
marina to allow open access to public waters to all individuals.  The hallmark of property 
is found in the right to exclude, and this exclusion right was destroyed when state action 
turned the property from private to common. Here the residual rights of use of the 
original owner should reduce the damages allowable from this taking, but even though 
this was only a “partial” taking of sorts, it was a “complete” taking of the right to 
                                                 
18444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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exclude. Thus, the obligation to compensate was determined under the virtual per se 
taking rules that are used in the cases of direct government occupation. One other way to 
look at this scenario is to hold that the government does not escape its obligation to 
compensate landowners simply because the benefit of state use is not confined to the 
government in its collective capacity, but works for the benefit of undifferentiated 
members of the public. The key test is whether other individuals are allowed to go where 
before they were prohibited. This line applies with equal force in the area of trade secrets, 
in which indeed the most common form of theft never eliminates the right of the owner to 
use his own trade secret.19 
The two types of cases just considered must both be contrasted with various forms 
of government regulation in which the “sole”—a term that must be used with much 
trepidation—consequence of the government action is to restrict the use of the property in 
question, without involving any direct use of the property by the state. The paradigmatic 
illustration of this practice is in fact everyday zoning,20 in which the public benefits from 
the land use restrictions on others come about indirectly.  For example, lower congestion 
and more open space are both consequences of zoning. For these purposes, the key 
difference from the earlier cases derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn 
Central v. City of New York, which subjects use restrictions on property to far lower 
standards of judicial review.21 The standard formulation indicates that so long as the 
regulated user retains some viable economic use of the property in question, he cannot 
complain of the loss of the right to use because he keeps many other “sticks” in the 
bundle of property rights. This formulation of the question is subject to two strong, 
                                                 
19See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1. 
20See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 265 (1926). 
21 438 U.S. 105 (1978). 
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indeed insuperable, objections. The first asks how to define the tipping point that 
separates those restrictions of economic use that render property economically viable and 
those that do not. The second asks how to define what counts as “the property” to 
measure the loss in question. For example, if two adjacent plots are subject to common 
ownership, does the preservation of use rights on one justify their extinction on the other, 
and so on down the line.  
Whether we like the distinction established in Penn Central or not, it becomes 
important to work within the established framework. If, therefore, all legislation that 
pertains to trade secrets is treated as use restrictions, the lower rational basis test that 
derives its power from the Penn Central case will be used in connection with every 
system of regulation that deviates in any particular manner from the common law rules 
(or their codifications) that govern the subject. But again that character is incorrect in 
dealing with these cases. A use restriction of a trade secret involves the situation in which 
the holder of the trade secret is told that it cannot practice it in some location or use it for 
some product lines. These situations count as use restrictions because the owner of the 
trade secret still remains the only person who can practice the secret, even if he can do so 
over a narrower range than before. The analogy is a precise equivalent to a decision to 
allow a landowner to use property only for residential purposes, which does not allow 
anyone else the use of the property in question. However, the aforementioned regulations 
that require turning over the information contained in a trade secret are the intangible 
equivalent of direct occupation. 
The issue here is of great importance because of the way in which it shapes the 
attitudes to these comprehensive trade secret disclosure schemes. In Monsanto, for 
RAE: Chicago IP 6/20/03 10 
example, the Court was asked to evaluate different iterations of a scheme found in the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).22 It contained a non-
problematic initial period when submitted information is not shared with a rival claimant, 
but which, once the period has expired, still authorizes the Environmental Protection 
Agency to use trade secret information that it has acquired from an earlier permit 
applicant to evaluate the safety of a product that is prepared by a subsequent applicant. 
The provision in question in the case was part of an elaborate statutory compromise about 
the kinds of uses that could be made of trade secret information for the purposes of 
dealing with health and safety. As such, it implicates the next three questions associated 
with the generalized takings inquiry, having to do with public use, police power 
justifications and just compensation. The first question deals with whether the taking is 
for a public use. In the present case, there is little doubt that the use of this information by 
government agencies to evaluate the products that are submitted by others counts as a 
public use of an intangible property right. Thus, the operation of the statute should not be 
enjoined, even if we back off the very broad, indeed grotesque, view that finds a public 
use whenever there is any “conceivable” public benefit from certain forms of government 
actions.23 It takes no master of analogy to see that testing for environmental impacts 
differs from forcing a Hawaiian landlord to sale his reversionary interest to a sitting 
tenant for a price that is stipulated by the state, even if the Supreme Court unwisely held 
the latter a taking for public use.  
                                                 
2261 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U. S. C. § 136). 
23See Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). It is instructive to note the 
differences in nuance between Monsanto and Midkiff, two cases that were decided in the same term of the 
Supreme Court. 
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Even after the public use issue has been decided, there is still the question of 
whether the taking passes muster because the government has provided suitable 
compensation in cash or kind. Under FIFRA a number of options were available to the 
EPA with respect to the information requested. In principle it could disclose that 
information to the public, even though in practice it did not adopt this particular option. It 
could surely take the information in question and give it to a rival claimant in order to 
reduce the time and cost needed to process its application. The statute itself contained 
certain requirements for compensation with respect to the shared use of that information, 
so that the basic pattern of the takings clause is respected in dealing with the matter. At 
this point, the only real question is whether the amount of compensation meets the usual 
tests, which, insofar as they ignore loss of good will and consequential damages, are far 
too favorable to the government.  
What is troublesome about the present situation is the unargued assumption in 
Monsanto that the government program should be evaluated in terms of the lower 
standards of review that are applicable for a regulatory taking.  At this point, the inquiry 
slips into an “ad hoc” discussion of the Penn Central test with its three major 
components: "the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations."24 These three dubious 
components do not advance the analysis of any takings question. The first is most 
uninformative because it does not explain why different treatments ought to be attached 
in the end to coercive government behavior. Coercive government behavior is the same 
no matter what form it takes. The second is seemingly irrelevant because it does not 
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explain why the size of the impact goes to the question of coverage under the takings 
clause, rather than the valuation of an individual case.   
The last requirement, that there be “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” 
is at best useless and at worst mischievous.  If the question is whether individuals have a 
reasonable expectation that their property will be taken by government action, then the 
answer depends on how one deals with reasonableness. If the question is only predictive, 
namely, whether individuals and firms rightly fear that governments will act in disrespect 
of common law property rights, then the worse that government behaves, the stronger its 
defenses against constitutional challenges. Yet no one accepts that argument with respect 
to cases of outright government occupation: why then should it be decisive, in the wrong 
way, with respect to regulations? The Constitution is a tool to restrain government power, 
not a device for forcing private parties to mitigate at their own expense the losses from 
government misconduct. Individuals who are warned by prior forms of government 
misbehavior must, as they can, steer clear of those actions that provoke the wrath of the 
state. The difficulty with this point of view is that it requires Hobbesian responses to what 
is supposed to be a Lockean world. The private action to mitigate damages is not what is 
required because it will reduce the levels of innovation and invention that allow the 
system to operate successfully in the first place. It seems therefore that more than 
predictive weight has to be attached to the idea of “reasonableness” under the 
circumstances. This interpretation, in turn, requires some sense that the arrangements in 
question respond to some legitimate government purposes that are, at a minimum, 
justified by more than a crude appeal to the notion that “we trap you inside the jungle and 
therefore can expropriate all that you own.” 
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The differences in these two points of view are of great importance. Under the 
second, normative account of these tests, we do have a police power justification for 
running examinations to see that the chemicals in question meet the standards of public 
health and safety. But we can surely achieve this particular goal without the publication 
of the content of the trade secret and without allowing subsequent applicants to use the 
information free of charge. The information that is required is delivered under a pledge of 
constitutionality that insulates it from constitutional reproach. Stated otherwise, the police 
power requires not only the articulation of an intelligent end, but also the selection of 
means that fit the end in question. So long as the health and safety objectives can be met 
without compromising the content of the trade secret, the statute must choose means that 
satisfy the dual imperatives of protecting both private property and public health. It 
follows, therefore, that there is a clear restriction on how the government agency may use 
the trade secret information entrusted in its care. That information may be used to 
facilitate review of the application of the firm that held the trade secret without any 
compensation at all. However, beyond that there are difficulties that rightly require 
compensation. The publication of the information willy-nilly does not advance the health 
and safety in any particular way that could not be achieved by warnings of those dangers 
that might be encountered in ordinary use. In addition, any gains that could be obtained 
by allowing second-generation firms to use this information can be obtained even if they 
are required to compensate the first-mover for the partial loss of its trade secret. Further, 
this market setting ensures Pareto efficiency because the second generation firm will not 
pay for the information unless he values it more than the price, and the first-mover will 
only give it if he values the price more than the cost of secret diffusion. The language 
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about “reasonable investment-backed expectations” is therefore redundant and circular to 
the extent that it purports to do anything more than refer courts back to the four key 
questions that animate any inquiry under the takings law.  
Yet the Court’s analysis has not followed this interpretation. Rather, once the 
Penn Central test erroneously was assumed to apply, the entire inquiry shifted from 
government justification to assumption of risk by the holder of the trade secret. Thus, 
Justice Blackmun first observed that “Monsanto was on notice of the manner in which the 
EPA was authorized to use and disclose any data turned over to it by an applicant for 
registration.”25 The clear inference is that by virtue of the fact that it had the ability to 
keep the information from the government, the holder necessarily assumed the risk of its 
partial or total disclosure once it handed that information over to the government. “If, 
despite the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions in the statute, Monsanto 
chose to submit the requisite data in order to receive a registration, it can hardly argue 
that its reasonable investment-backed expectations are disturbed when the EPA acts to 
use or disclose the data in a manner that was authorized by law at the time of the 
submission.”26 After all, it could still sell its products in some overseas markets (unless it 
were subject to the same adverse conditions.) 
At this point Justice Blackmun’s entire analysis breaks down because of the 
on/off character of investment-backed expectations. Let the submission be made before 
the requirement is imposed, and it looks as though there is no justification for the 
restriction in question. But once there is notice in advance of what will be required, then 
there is an “overwhelming” case against the protection of the trade secret because the 
                                                 
25Id. at 1006. 
26Id. at 1006–1007. 
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expectation of privacy utterly vanishes. The point here is that the voluntary submission is 
said to undo the property protection, which in turn leads to the question of why the 
decision to submit the data is called voluntary. In the ordinary case a decision is 
voluntary because the party who makes it can decline to do so without the loss of any 
other rights. But this regulatory scheme is not part of an ordinary bargain between equal 
strangers from which Monsanto could walk away at its free will and pleasure. At 
common law Monsanto would have the antecedent right to market its products without 
the need for any preclearance from the government, subject to the usual rules that deal 
with damages and injunctions in the event that its fungicides prove dangerous to others. 
In the present system, the statute deprives them of that marketing right prior to the time 
of any submission, without any compensation being paid at all. If that baseline had been 
properly obtained, then the language of mutual gain would justify the use of the 
assumption of risk theme implicit in the phrase “reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.” But it was improperly obtained, for the government cannot just tell people 
that they cannot receive a permit. The permit power does not give it implicit ownership 
rights over the private property, but this power must be exercised only for some good 
cause, which needs to be illustrated. If this were not the case, the government could 
announce to one and all that no one could do anything without a permit, be it occupy 
land, sell products or protest some regulatory scheme. At that point the state could pay in 
funny money, by offering to return to private persons the rights that it had just obtained 
by fiat in exchange for some fresh concession. Thus, the government could demand that 
if you wish to build a house on beachfront property, then you must yield to the 
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government an easement across the front of the property—27or for that matter, half the 
land in question.  
It seems clear that the entire case must raise the vexing doctrine of 
“unconstitutional conditions,” which places limits on the ability of the government to 
require individuals to waive their constitutional rights, including those to property under 
the takings clause,28 in order to escape the burden of some regulatory exaction. Justice 
Blackmun blithely notes the possibility that this doctrine could apply, but quickly 
concludes that it really does not matter in this case because the entire issue concerns 
health and safety over which the government power to regulate is secure. Therefore, he 
never asks the question of whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine imposes any 
limitation on the strength of the quid pro quo the government can exact in connection 
with basic regulation. He thus downplays the critical role that the compensation system 
and the sharp restrictions on public and private disclosure played in the evaluation of 
FIFRA. Quite simply, the decision refuses to acknowledge the narrower grounds on 
which it is both possible and proper to uphold FIFRA. Rather, Blackmun makes the 
clever observation that the statutory conditions were not that onerous because Monsanto 
continued to invest in research after FIFRA and its various modifications were on the 
books. However, that result did not occur because the government could always have its 
way on matters of environmental regulation so long as it gives public notice of its 
intention. Instead, it is because FIFRA contained both compensation and confidentiality 
requirements that satisfied the more exacting tests of just compensation and police power 
justification.  
                                                 
27See Nollan v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
28See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993). 
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The confusion that was sowed in Monsanto came to a head in the endless 
litigation, in which I took part as a consultant for the tobacco companies, that took place 
in the First Circuit29 over the constitutionality of Massachusetts 307B.30 This statute 
required that certain key ingredients in tobacco (other than the tobacco itself) be 
disclosed to the department of public health in order of their relative concentrations. The 
DPH could be released generally “for the purpose of protecting public health,” so long as 
the Attorney General did not think that the public disclosure of the trade secret 
information exposed the state to liabilities under the takings clause.  
The statute itself does not ostensibly require any holder of a trade secret to expose 
all the flavorings added to their cigarettes, or to explain how the ingredients are 
combined. However, the published information unequivocally makes it easier for a 
competitor to reverse engineer the distinctive taste of any cigarette, a task that is 
                                                 
29See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997); Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998); Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 
2000). See also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) 
30§ 307B. Manufacture of tobacco products; annual reports including added constituents and nicotine 
yield ratings; disclosure; exclusions 
For the purpose of protecting the public health, any manufacturer of cigarettes, snuff or chewing 
tobacco sold in the commonwealth shall provide the department of public health with an annual report, 
in a form and at a time specified by that department, which lists for each brand of such product sold the 
following information: 
(a) The identity of any added constituent other than tobacco, water or reconstituted tobacco 
sheet made wholly from tobacco, to be listed in descending order according to weight, measure, or 
numerical count; and 
(b) The nicotine yield ratings, which shall accurately predict nicotine intake for average 
consumers, based on standards to be established by the department of public health. 
The nicotine yield ratings so provided, and any other such information in the annual reports with 
respect to which the department determines that there is a reasonable scientific basis for concluding 
that the availability of such information could reduce risks to public health, shall be public records; 
provided, however, that before any public disclosure of such information the department shall request 
the advice of the attorney general whether such disclosure would constitute an unconstitutional taking 
of property, and shall not disclose such information unless and until the attorney general advises that 
such disclosure would not constitute an unconstitutional taking. 
This section shall not require a manufacturer, in its report to the department or otherwise, to 
identify or disclose the specific amount of any ingredient that has been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, Public Health Service, United States Department of Health and Human Services 
("FDA"), or its successor agency, as safe when burned and inhaled or that has been designated by the 
FDA, or its successor agency, as generally recognized as safe when burned and inhaled, according to 
the Generally Recognized As Safe list of the FDA. 
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exceedingly difficult to undertake without that information because the act of burning the 
tobacco often destroys or transforms its initial ingredients. No one denied the 
characterization of the disclosures as a partial taking of the initial trade secret that falls 
into the pattern established in Kaiser-Aetna. The point hardly counts as news in light of 
the explicit statutory provision that blocks disclosure “unless and until the attorney 
general advises that such disclosure would not constitute an unconstitutional taking.” 
The next question that arises is how best to deal with the statute in question once 
the prima facie case has been established. The right way to think about the issue is to note 
that the submission of information should not be regarded as “voluntary” in that the price 
that is paid for the failure to conform to the new law is the loss of any ability to sell the 
property within Massachusetts. The case, therefore, becomes one in which the ability to 
avoid one obligation only comes with the sacrifice of a related constitutional right. In one 
sense, the case is no different to the tobacco companies than a law that sets forth that if 
they wish to sell their products within the state of Massachusetts, they must deed over the 
title to their Boston headquarters to the state. In dealing with the prima facie case, it does 
not matter what form of property is surrendered. All exactions of this sort force a person 
to choose between two entitlements, similar to the robber who gives his hapless victim 
the choice between his money and his life.  
In response, Massachusetts should forcefully disagree with the analogy on the 
ground that its statute is justified by the police power in the name of public health in a 
way in which a seizure of the Boston headquarters is not. However, that conclusion only 
works if one takes (as Justice Blackmun implied in Monsanto) a rational basis view (if 
one can call it that) of the police power under which a mere whiff of a public health 
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interest is sufficient to insulate the statute from all forms of additional review. But any 
sensible regime of takings law cannot allow a constitutional protection created at the 
front end to be eviscerated at the back end, without at least some look at the methods 
chosen to pursue the public health. Here the differences between FIFRA and the 
Massachusetts scheme are simply too large to be ignored.31 The targets of the 
Massachusetts statute were such potent additives as parsley sage, rosemary and thyme, or 
at least “sugars, glycerin, propylene glycol, cocoa, and licorice.”32 All of these elements 
are common in all sorts of common food (and one assumes pharmaceutical) preparations, 
in which their use goes without notice. There was no showing, or even suggestion, that 
the presence of these elements in tobacco posed a greater threat than they did in other 
contexts. Yet the statute does not purport to regulate their use in any other product. Nor 
for that matter is there any showing that a consumer who is constantly bombarded with 
information about the dangers of nicotine and tar, all of which are fully disclosed and 
discussed, could attach any but the most evanescent interest in the ingredients for which 
disclosure is routinely required under the statute. The inference in this case is inescapable 
that the information in question is of value to only one segment of the public, namely, 
rival producers. These rivals would be able to combine this information with that 
available from other sources to reverse engineer trade secrets on flavorings in which the 
tobacco companies have invested millions, and for which they take incredible precautions 
to keep them from falling into enemy hands. Moreover, the entire disclosure was far 
beyond that provided under both the federal statute and under the statutes of other states. 
In these statutes, the information in question was collected in confidence by the 
                                                 
31Cf. Robert K. Hur, Takings, Trade Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
447, 473–474 (2000) (noting the less restrictive alternatives available).  
32Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2002).  
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government agency unless and until some investigation revealed that it posed some 
danger to public health, at which point the firm could either redesign the product or face 
publication of the offending result.33  The traditional account of the police power is broad 
enough to include regulatory schemes that are intended for the protection of the “health, 
safety, morals and general welfare.” Even in the heyday of substantive due process, the 
scope of the police power was regarded as strong enough to require the publication of 
trade secret information that was necessary to prevent various forms of consumer fraud.34 
But the traditional formulation of the police power was intended to exclude those statutes 
that had primarily an anticompetitive effect, as by providing one class of firms an 
advantage that it denied to its rivals. In these cases, the simple incantation that the 
disclosures are for public health cannot save a statute that yields its secrets under the 
most cursory of reviews. 
 In dealing with this situation, a badly split First Circuit came to the right decision 
when the two judges who struck down the statute were in fundamental disagreement on 
how to apply the Monsanto decision. Judge Torruella took the view that the three-part 
test from Penn Central applied. He concluded that the decisive feature was that the 
impact of the government regulation was severe because of the destruction of the trade 
secret, while its health justification was weak. The basic conclusion is correct, largely 
because it downplays the notice and assumption of risk rationales in Monsanto that would 
lead to the opposite conclusion.  
Judge Selya disagreed, and believed that the reasonable investment-backed 
                                                 
33MINN. STAT. § 461.17 (1997) (covering only certain specified additives). TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 
161.351-55 (2001) (requiring the report of brand-specific ingredients in descending order, but banning 
disclosure for information that counts as trade secrets under federal law). 
34Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919).  
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expectations should trump. He found in Monsanto clear intimations that the dominant 
factor in the case related not to the nature of the state imposition, but to the clear sense 
that this decision dashed the reasonable expectations of the tobacco firms because it was 
imposed after their products reached the market. In so doing he relied on Justice 
Blackmun’s observation in Monsanto that “we find that the force of this factor is so 
overwhelming” that it is not necessary to consider either the nature of the private interest 
or the type of government intervention. That said, he then inexplicitly, appears to ignore 
the rest of the sentence that provides “at least with respect to certain of the data submitted 
by Monsanto to the EPA, that it disposes of the taking question regarding those data.” 
The clear implication of Justice Blackmun’s logic was that the prior notice in this case 
doomed the claim for protected status. But that assertion does not support the converse 
proposition that if notice is lacking, the regulation in question has to fail regardless of 
other circumstances. This rapid oscillation between the on/off switches leaves open the 
possibility that the regulation might be per se valid when applied to some new product or 
reformulated version of existing products, which took place after the statute was on the 
books. 
III.  CONCLUSION  
In dealing with these issues, there is, yet again, abundant support for two key 
propositions. First, it is a mistake in dealing with intellectual property questions to 
assume that the differences between intellectual property and tangible property are 
invariably so broad that it is necessary to start over whenever any serious question of 
intellectual property law arises. In this case there are some differences between trade 
secrets and tangible property in the articulation of the right to exclude, but none of these 
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bear any relevance to the overall analysis of the two cases. Second, in dealing with this 
issue the takings law remains a mess for two reasons. One applies generally to all types 
of property, and the other pertains exclusively to intellectual property law. The general 
problem with takings law is the large gulf in the rules that govern physical and regulatory 
takings. It is not possible to draw any principled line between these types of takings that 
justifies the use of strict scrutiny in the former case and rational basis test in the latter.  
The specific problem with takings law applied to intellectual property is that, in 
dealing with trade secrets, the flawed treatment of regulatory takings articulated in Penn 
Central is the only framework that is relevant.  Once the decision is made to analogize to 
the distinction between occupations and use restrictions in the physical takings context, it 
becomes clear that this case should be treated on a par with the former and not the latter, 
even though both FIFRA and the Massachusetts statutes are undoubtedly types of 
regulation. A simple use restriction of a trade secret only prevents its holder from using it 
in certain products or processes, but it does not require that a party share the information 
with others. This coerced sharing in the world of intellectual property is similar to an 
occupation of property by others in the world of real property. In making this claim, it 
would be unwise to argue that the stricter standard applied to occupation cases should 
block any police power justification that the government might offer. But it does require 
that these justifications be tested and not accepted on face value.  
 It is easy to pooh-pooh this case as making a mountain out of a mole-hill, as at 
least one student author has done.35 The stakes in getting the right analysis on this 
matter are high, for the much despised tobacco industry is not the only potential 
target of trade secret regulation. Similar rules with a health and safety rationale 
could be imposed on pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, or indeed any other consumer 
product. It is a credit to our political institutions that they have as of yet not 
                                                 
 
35See Hur, supra note 30.  
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attempted such efforts, but with the manifest hostility toward the pharmaceutical 
industry, an approach such as this might well be in the wings. The thesis here is 
that there is no reason to run that risk at all. The procedures whereby trade secrets 
are disclosed to regulators under a promise of confidentiality unless or until some 
danger is discovered imitates a set of practices that are routinely used with the 
voluntary transferring and licensing of trade secrets. It falls easily within the 
scope of the police power even if we do engage in the usual gymnastics that 
surround takings jurisprudence. However, when the government can give the 
trade secrets away on a whim, constitutional problems arise. There is still time to 
place the protection of trade secrets on a more secure constitutional footing, and 
do away with the erroneous intellectual property analysis that flies under the false 
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